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Abstract 
This paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of the ECB's quantitative easing 
programme using an open-economy DSGE model estimated with Bayesian tech-
niques. Using data on government debt stocks and yields across maturities we 
identify the parameter governing portfolio adjustment in the private sector. Shock 
decompositions suggest a positive contribution of ECB QE to EA year-on-year 
output growth and inflation of up to 0.4 and 0.5 pp in the standard linearized ver-
sion of the model. Allowing for an occasionally binding zero-bound constraint by 
using piecewise linear solution techniques raises the positive impact up to 1.0 and 
0.7 pp, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
In early 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) has joined the group of central banks that have 
implemented large-scale asset purchase programmes as unconventional policy measures. These 
asset purchases, also called Quantitative Easing (QE), have led to a strong extension of the cen-
tral banks' balance sheets. By end-July 2015 the amount of outright purchases on the balance 
sheet had reached 24% of GDP in the case of the US Federal Reserve, 64% of GDP in the case of 
the Bank of Japan, 21% of GDP in the case of the Bank of England, and 5% of GDP in the case 
of the ECB (Constâncio 2015). The ECB's QE programme announced in January 2015 (Public 
Sector Purchase Programme) foresaw buying €60 billion of assets a month from March 2015 to 
September 2016, which in sum corresponds to circa 10% of annualised euro area (EA) GDP. In 
December 2015, the ECB has extended the programme until March 2017, and it has raised the 
amount of monthly purchases to €80 billion starting from April 2016. In December 2016 the pro-
gramme has been extended and modified again, lengthening the period of asset purchases until (at 
least) December 2017, but at a reduced pace of €60 billion of assets a month after March 2017. 
Operating close to the zero lower bound (ZLB), the ECB considered its "conventional" 
monetary accommodation to be insufficient to address weak inflation dynamics, falling inflation 
expectations and sizeable economic slack in the EA. As a result, the balance sheet interventions 
were proposed to "achieve the price stability objective, given that interest rates have reached their 
lower bound" (Draghi 2015). In practice, the ECB purchases public sector financial assets (gov-
ernment debt) of longer maturity and extends liquidity (base money) to the private sector (Claeys 
et al. 2015, Valiante 2015). Research at the ECB has provided evidence for an impact of the QE 
programme on long-term bond yields and spillover to other asset prices through portfolio reallo-
cation: Altavilla et al. (2015) in an event study report a 30-50 basis-point decline in 10-year gov-
ernment bond yields with spillover into lower corporate bond, spreads, higher equity prices, and 
euro depreciation. Andrade et al. (2016) report a decline of EA 10-year government bond yields 
in the range 27-64 basis points in the context of the ECB's extended asset purchases programme 
with spillover into higher equity prices and inflation expectations. The evidence in De Santis 
(2016) suggests that ECB non-standard policy has reduced EA 10-year government bond yields 
between September 2014 and October 2015 on average by 63 basis points.      
This paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of the ECB's QE programme using a two-
region DSGE model for the EA and the rest of the world (RoW), estimated with Bayesian tech-
niques. QE is introduced into the model by adding a central bank balance sheet and distinguish-
ing between short-term and long-term government debt. We use a formulation of private-sector 
portfolio preferences - as, e.g., Andres et al. (2004) - that allows for non-neutral effects of central 
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bank purchase programmes due to imperfect substitutability between assets of different maturity. 
More specifically, the central bank alters its balance sheet by purchasing long-term bonds (the 
latter modelled as in Woodford, 2001) and injecting liquidity to the private sector. Our specifica-
tion of QE allows us to capture its effects through a large number of the transmission channels 
put forward by the literature (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011) including the sav-
ing, financing cost, exchange rate, inflation, and fiscal channels. The exchange rate channel is 
absent from most model-based studies of QE policies (e.g., Chen et al. 2012, De Graeve and 
Theodoridis 2016, Gertler and Karadi 2011), which build instead on closed-economy frame-
works.  
The contribution of this paper is to analyse the macroeconomic impact of ECB QE using a 
state-of-the-art estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Combining 
data on government debt stocks and yields across maturities, the model estimation enables to ex-
tract a value for the crucial parameter governing the portfolio adjustment costs of households. 
The implied strength of these costs dictates the magnitude of the yield spread following QE of a 
given volume and time path, such as the one announced by the ECB in January 2015. Given that 
ECB QE has been launched only in 2015, we have little data points for the QE episode itself. 
Data-driven identification of the degree of substitutability between short-term and long-term 
bonds in our model therefore has to rely mainly on the pre-QE part of the sample. Lags in the 
transmission of QE to the real economy furthermore imply that the effects of the ongoing pro-
gramme have not fully materialised yet.  
The analysis starts with a standard linearized version of the model in which the Taylor 
rule is never hitting the ZLB (we refer to this as "unconstrained model" in the text). We then turn 
to a model version with occasionally binding constraints in which the ZLB can become binding 
endogenously when contractionary shocks drive the target ("shadow") interest rate below the 
lower bound (we refer to this as "constrained model" in the text). According to our shock decom-
positions from the estimated unconstrained model, QE as captured by the model has increased 
EA year-on-year output growth and inflation in 2015q1-16q2 by 0.3 pp and 0.3 pp on average, 
with maximum impact of 0.4 and 0.5 pp in 2016. Including the endogenously and occasionally 
binding ZLB constraint raises the 2015q1-16q2 average growth and inflation effect of QE to 0.7 
and 0.4 pp, respectively, with peaks at 1.0 and 0.7 pp in 2016q2. The stronger QE impact in the 
constrained model is due to the absence of a countervailing short-term policy rate response when 
the ZLB binds in 2015-16 in the constrained model.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the closely re-
lated literature; section 3 outlines the general structure of the model; section 4 describes the mod-
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el solution and estimation methodology; section 5 presents parameter estimates; section 6 dis-
cusses the impact of QE in the unconstrained model; section 7 present results from the model 
with occasionally binding constraint; section 8 summarizes the paper and concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The empirical relevance of individual channels and the aggregate macroeconomic effects of QE 
are an empirical matter and likely to vary with structural features of the economy across countries 
and time. So far there is little (published) research on the effects of the ECB QE, and particularly 
little model-based analysis. Most existing papers consider unconventional monetary policy in the 
US and the UK and their spillovers to the world economy. This literature has been summarised, 
e.g., in Priftis and Vogel (2016). Here, we limit ourselves to the review of model-based general-
equilibrium (DSGE) analyses that focus on the impact of QE on portfolio rebalancing and financ-
ing costs. 
 The central contribution of this paper is the incorporation of central bank balance sheet 
policy (QE) in a large-scale open-economy macroeconomic model and estimation of this model 
on euro area data. The approach is closest to Chen et al. (2012) and De Graeve and Theodoridis 
(2016) who analyse US QE in estimated closed-economy models of the US economy. Both Chen 
et al. (2012) and De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016) focus on the portfolio balancing channel of 
QE transmission. 
According to the results in Chen et al. (2012), the US LSAP II (large-scale asset purchase) 
programme, with a volume of circa 4% of US GDP, combined with a commitment to keep inter-
est rates low for an extended period of time has raised US real GDP growth by around 0.13% and 
inflation by only 0.03 percentage points (pp). According to the estimates of De Graeve and The-
odoridis (2016), "Operation Twist", the purchase of long-term and sale of short-term maturity 
bonds of circa 2% of US GDP by the Federal Reserve, has increased US real GDP by 0.6% and 
inflation by up to 0.3 pp.  
The models by Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Carlstrom et al. (2017) assume financially 
constrained financial intermediaries, where QE eases the constraint on financing productive in-
vestment in the economy. In these models, productive capital is financed by financial intermedi-
aries based on their net worth and the deposits made by households. In a calibrated version of 
their model, Gertler and Karadi (2013) quantify the impact of US LSAP with a volume of 2.5% 
of GDP on output and inflation to 1% and 1.5 pp respectively if policy rates remain unchanged, 
and to 0.2% and 0.2 pp respectively if the standard monetary policy rule is active and partly off-
sets expansionary QE effects by an increase in the short-term rate. While the transmission can be 
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described in terms of the credit channel, recent empirical analyses (see, e.g., Bluwstein and Ca-
nova 2016, Tillman and Ludering 2016) do not suggest the credit channel to be a primary trans-
mission mechanism for QE in the EA and spillover to non-EA countries. 
Sahuc (2016) borrows the Gertler-Karadi model for an assessment of ECB QE policy that 
involves asset purchases of circa 9% of EA GDP. Like Gertler and Karadi (2013), the Sahuc 
(2016) assessment stresses the importance of keeping short-run policy rates low for longer. Keep-
ing the policy rate constant only in 2015 gives a maximum QE effect on output growth and infla-
tion of 0.2 and 0.1 pp in 2015-6, whereas keeping the policy rate unchanged for another year 
raises the average output growth and inflation effect in 2015-6 to 0.6 and 0.6 pp. 
 
3. Model description 
The present analysis uses a modified two-region (EA and ROW) framework of Kollmann et al. 
(2016) and extends this model to incorporate non-standard monetary policy. The model is esti-
mated using quarterly data for the period 1999q1-2016q2.  
The EA region assumes two (representative) households, intermediate and final goods 
firms and a government. Ricardian households have access to financial markets, whereas liquidi-
ty-constrained household consume their disposable income in every period. Preferences of both 
types of households exhibit habit formation in both consumption and leisure. A monopolistically-
competitive sector produces differentiated goods by employing domestic labor and capital. Firms 
in this sector maximize the present value of their dividends at a discount factor that is strictly 
larger than the risk-free rate and varies over time, subject to investment and labour adjustment 
costs and a varying capacity utilization rate. Final goods firms combine a domestic differentiated 
goods bundle with energy inputs. Nominal differentiated goods prices are sticky as are the wages 
paid to the workers; the latter being determined by monopolistic trade unions.  The fiscal authori-
ty imposes distortive taxes and issue debt.  
The exposition below describes the QE-relevant extensions. A detailed overview of the 
general model can be found in Kollmann et al. (2016) and the model appendix. 
We extend the model by introducing features of non-standard monetary policy as in Priftis 
and Vogel (2016), which is similar in spirit to the modelling of QE in Chen et al. (2012) and De 
Graeve and Theodoridis (2016). Similar to Chen et al. (2012) and De Graeve and Theodoridis 
(2016), our model emphasises the transmission of QE mainly through portfolio rebalancing. 
However, unlike these studies, our multi-country model allows for an exchange rate channel and 
potential trade effects from QE. 
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In line with the standard notion, QE is introduced as a monetary policy strategy that in-
creases the size of the central bank's balance sheet. In particular, the central bank purchases long-
term (government) bonds, with the aim of reducing the interest spread between long and short 
maturities, i.e. to flatten the yield curve. The central bank finances the bond purchases by provid-
ing additional liquidity to the private sector. QE intends to affect private-sector portfolio and sav-
ing decisions especially when short-term policy rates are already at or close to the zero lower 
bound (ZLB).  
We introduce short-term and long-term government debt to incorporate investor prefer-
ences for a maturity mix and central bank balance sheet operations in the model. Following 
Woodford (2001) long-term government debt is modelled through bonds for which the nominal 
coupon c, which is a fraction of the principal, depreciates over time at rate 
b .
1
 The price in peri-
od t of a long-term bond issued in t (
N
tP ) equals the discounted value of future payments 
1
0 (1 )
nT
N b
t n
n
P c
i





 , where T is the maturity period of the bond. Analogously, the price in period t 
of a long-term bond issued in t-1 (
O
tP ) equals the discounted sum of outstanding payments, 
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0 (1 )
nT
O b
t n
n
P c
i
 




 . If (1 ) 1b i    and T is large, the price in t of long-term bonds issued in t-1 
corresponds (approximately) to the price of newly issued long-term bonds times the depreciation 
rate: 
(1) 
O N
t b tP P  
Equation (1) shows that the price of the long-term bond that pays a declining coupon declines 
over time at the rate 
b . Total outstanding government debt at face value consists of long-term 
bonds 
L
tB , held by the private sector (
,L H
tB ) and the central bank (
,L CB
tB ), and short-term bonds ,
S
tB : 
(2) 
, ,L H L CB S
t t t tB B B B    
The short-term and long-term bonds are imperfect substitutes in the model. In particular, private 
investors have a preference for holding a mix of short-term and long-term bonds, and deviations 
from the target value   for the ratio of long-term over short-term debt induce quadratic adjust-
ment costs ( b ).
2
 
                                                 
1 The Woodford (2001) perpetual-bond formulation is also be used by, e.g., Carlstrom et al. (2017).       
2 The same formulation has been used previously by, e.g., Andrés et al. (2004), Falagiarda (2013), Harrison (2012), 
and Liu et al. (2015). 
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Private households with access to financial markets (superscript r for Ricardian) face the 
following optimisation problem:
3
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Ricardian households receive labour income, returns on financial assets, income kti  from lending 
capital to firms net of an (exogenous) risk/insurance premium given revenue uncertainty 
t , and 
dividends 
tD  from firm ownership. 1(1 )t t k tK I K     is the capital stock as the sum of new 
investment 
tI  and the pre-period capital stock depreciated at rate k . The government levies 
taxes wtt  on income from labour, 
k
tt  on corporate income and 
c
tt on consumption. The price in 
period t of a short-term (1-period) bond of nominal value StB  is / (1 )
S
t tB i , with ti  being the 
short-term nominal interest rate. Analogously, * */ (1 )t t te B i  is the price in domestic currency of a 
foreign bond *tB , where te  is the nominal exchange rate as the value in domestic currency of one 
unit of foreign currency.  
The maximisation problem (3) provides the following first-order conditions (FOC):  
(4)      1 1
,
1
( ) ( ) ( 1)
1
Sr
Nt t t
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t t t t t
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E E P
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3 The description of the budget constraint here omits adjustment costs in the real sector of the economy (price, wage, 
capital stock, and labour adjustment costs) that do not affect the first-order conditions for portfolio holdings and 
savings. These adjustment costs (which generate, e.g., nominal price and wage stickiness) are present in the full 
version of the model that underlies the simulations. Details on the specification of the real-sector adjustment frictions 
can be found, e.g., in Priftis and Vogel (2016) and in the appendix. 
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Combining (4) with (6), (7) and (8) illustrates the transmission channels of QE to the real econo-
my:       
(10)      
* *
, *
1
( )1 1
( 1) ( )
1 1
S
N t t t t
b t t fL H
t t t t t
B e e B B
P E
i B e i P
   

 
    
  
 
(11)      
,
1
1 1
( 1) ( )
1 (1 ) ( )
S C
N t t
b t tL H C k k k
t t t t t k t t k
B P
P E
i B P i t i
  
  
  
     
 
(12)      1
,
1 1
(1 )1
( 1)
1 (1 )
S c c C
N t t t t
b t L H c c C
t t t t t
B t P U
P
i B t P U
    
 

  
 
 
The impact on asset prices of the central bank's purchase of long-term bonds derives from the 
private investors' portfolio adjustment costs ( 0b  ), i.e. imperfect substitutability between dif-
ferent financial assets. If 0b  , the effects of reducing 
,L H
tB  relative to 
S
tB  in the household 
portfolio are similar to the impact of a reduction of the short-term interest rate 
ti  in equation (4), 
and unconventional monetary policy can, hence, mimic the effect of reductions in the short-term 
interest rate. 
In particular, when the central bank intervenes by purchasing long-term bonds, private in-
vestors that aim at re-establishing the portfolio mix of short-term and long-term assets can re-
spond by holding more corporate equity and foreign bonds, and by reducing savings. The first 
response means a portfolio reallocation towards equity and foreign-currency assets that increases 
the price of corporate equity (rising stock market) and the price of foreign currency (exchange 
rate devaluation). Equation (10) shows that QE leads to higher demand for foreign assets and 
depreciation of the domestic currency (increase in te ) for given levels of ti  (restricted, e.g., at the 
ZLB) and *ti . Equation (11) illustrates the portfolio reallocation from government bonds towards 
corporate equity. Equation (12) shows that QE reduces private saving similar to a reduction in the 
short-term interest rate. 
Concerning the transmission to the real economy, i) rising stock markets reduce the fi-
nancing costs of corporations and, dampening the required return to capital, translate -under de-
creasing returns to capital- into stronger investment and capital accumulation, ii) exchange rate 
depreciation strengthens net exports provided that export and import demand are sufficiently 
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price elastic, and iii) reduced savings to restore the preferred portfolio mix strengthen contempo-
raneous consumption demand. 
The stock of government debt, which is, composed of short-term bonds and long-term bonds fol-
lows: 
(13) 1 1
( )
(1 )
S N S N L CB
Lt t t b t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t
B P B P c B PGE TAX PR
B
i P P P P P P P
      

 
where tPGE , tTAX  and 
CB
tPR  are, respectively, the primary government expenditure (public 
consumption, public investment, transfers), total tax revenue (labour, consumption, and corporate 
taxes), and the operating profit of the central bank as additional source of government revenue. 
The operating profit of the central bank equals the sum of base money issuance and interest in-
come minus the current expenditure on buying long-term bonds, where the latter equals the 
change of the value of long-term bonds on the central bank's balance sheet: 
(14) , , ,1 1( )
CB L CB N L CB N L CB
t t t t t b t tPR M cB P B P B       
Under the central bank's budget constraint (14), purchases of long-term government bonds can be 
financed either by increasing liquidity (money issuance), or by reducing the central bank's operat-
ing profit.
4
 In line with the standard definition of QE and the ECB announcement, we consider 
only the case of enhanced liquidity provision. 
Purchases of long-term bonds by the central bank can be modelled as endogenous re-
sponse to the economic environment (e.g., the economy's position in the business cycle, or the 
slope of the yield curve) similar to a Taylor rule, or as exogenous path. The set-up in this paper 
models QE as exogenous path that replicates the announced ECB programme in timing and size.  
 
4. Model solution and econometric approach 
We compute an approximate model solution by linearizing the model around its deterministic 
steady state. Following the recent literature that estimates DSGE models, we calibrate a subset of 
parameters to match long-run data properties, and we estimate the remaining parameters using 
Bayesian methods. The observables employed in estimation are listed in the Data Appendix.
5
 The 
estimation uses quarterly data for the period 1999q1-2016q2. We also perform estimation on the 
subsample 1999q1-2014q4 to test the stability of parameter estimates, especially the adjustment 
                                                 
4 A third option, in general, is for the central bank to sell other assets from its portfolio to sterilise the impact of its 
intervention on the central bank balance sheet. 
5 The observables are not demeaned or de-trended prior to estimation. The model is estimated on first differences of 
real GDP, real demand components and price indices, and on nominal ratios of aggregate demand components to 
GDP.  
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cost/portfolio preference parameter 
b , with respect to the implementation of QE. The model has 
been estimated using the slice sampler algorithm proposed by Neal (2003).
6
 
We calibrate the model steady state so that steady-state ratios of main economic aggre-
gates to GDP match average historical ratios over the sample period. The EA steady state ratios 
of private consumption and investment to GDP are set to 56% and 19%, respectively. The steady 
state shares of EA GDP in world GDP is 17%. The steady state trade share 
(0.5*(exports+imports)/GDP) is set at 18% in the EA (excluding intra-EA trade), and the quarter-
ly depreciation rate of capital is 1.4%. We set the steady state government debt/annual GDP ratio 
at 80% of GDP in the EA. The steady state real GDP growth and inflation rates are set to 0.35% 
and 0.4% per quarter, respectively, and the effective rate of time preferences to 0.25% per quar-
ter. 
With respect to the model extension to imperfect asset substitutability and non-standard 
monetary policy, we set the steady-state portfolio share of long-term to short-term government 
debt to 0.916 in line with the average of outstanding EA government debt over the sample period. 
We use data on swap rates of EA government bonds to determine the yield spread between short-
term and long-term bonds. In particular, we use the current and 3-month-ahead swap rates on 10-
year bonds to calculate the implied expected period-on-period return on long-term bonds. This 
approach is consistent with our modelling assumption that agents are not obliged to hold long-
term bonds to maturity, but rather can trade these bonds in the secondary market at each period in 
time. 
The results displayed in the following sections treat ECB QE as an AR(1) shock for which 
the estimated persistence is very high, as in Chen et al. (2012) and De Graeve and Theodoridis 
(2016). The specification as AR(1) implies that bond purchases by the central bank are not antic-
ipated by the private sector (e.g. the agents react only to action, even though further steps have 
already been announced by the ECB), which mutes the impact of announcement effects with re-
spect to further bond purchases. The high persistence – innovations have a half-life of 12 years – 
also implies that agents expect only very gradual exit from QE, however. Alternatively, we have 
tested a QE shock with random walk assumption. The random walk assumption implies that pri-
vate investors expect the balance sheet expansion to be permanent, i.e. no exit from QE in the 
sense of a return of the central bank balance sheet to pre-QE levels. Results for the highly persis-
tent AR(1) and the random walk shock specification are very similar.
7
 
                                                 
6 See also Planas et al. (2015) for a detailed description on the theory and practice of slice sampling.  
7 We have also tested an AR(2) specification of the QE shock. The AR coefficients are both close to 0.5 in this case 
and estimation results very similar to the AR(1) case.   
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5. Posterior parameter estimates
8
 
The posterior estimates of key model parameters for the EA are reported in Table 1. These esti-
mates are based on the unconstrained linearized version of the model and also used for the solu-
tion with occasionally binding constraint.  
Table 1: Prior and posterior distributions of key estimated EA model parameters. 
Description Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution 
 Dist. Mean (Std.) Mode (Std.) 
Preferences    
Consumption habit persistence B 0.5 (0.20) 0.89 (0.02) 
Risk aversion G 1.5 (0.20) 1.42 (0.15) 
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply G 2.5 (0.50) 2.29 (0.43) 
Import price elasticity G 2 (1) 1.98 (0.34) 
Steady state consumption share of Ric. HH B 0.65 (0.10) 0.85 (0.02) 
Nominal and real frictions    
Portfolio adjustment costs G 0.0015 (0.0006) 
0.0009 
(0.0003) 
Price adjustment cost G 60 (40) 26.6 (7.76) 
Nominal wage adj. cost G 5 (2) 5.86 (1.37) 
Real wage rigidity B 0.5 (0.20) 0.97 (0.01) 
Monetary Policy    
Interest rate persistence B 0.7 (0.12) 0.78 (0.03) 
Response to inflation B 2 (0.4) 1.68 (0.29) 
Response to GDP B 0.5 (0.2) 0.06 (0.03) 
Response to cumulative deflation gap G 0.005 (0.002) 0.006 (0.002) 
Autocorrelations of shocks    
QE (purchases of long-term bonds) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.987 (0.01) 
Bond risk premium B 0.5 (0.20) 0.77 (0.09) 
Domestic price mark-up B 0.5 (0.20) 0.19 (0.09) 
Standard deviations (%) of innovations    
Monetary Policy B 1 (0.40) 0.10 (0.00) 
QE (purchases of long-term bonds) G 1 (0.40) 2.1 (0.15) 
Investment risk premium G 0.1 (0.40) 0.19 (0.02) 
Bond risk premium G 1 (0.40) 0.54 (0.15) 
Domestic price mark-up G 2 (0.80) 3.05 (0.99) 
Notes: Cols. (1) lists model parameters and shocks. Cols. (2)-(3) indicates the prior distribution function (B: Beta distribution; G: 
Gamma distribution). Cols. (4)-(5) show the mode and the standard deviation (Std) of the posterior distributions of EA parame-
ters. 
                                                 
8 The presentation of the results focuses on the role of QE and the related parameter estimates, impulse responses and 
historical decompositions. Broader discussion of results can be found in Kollmann et al. (2016) and the related not-
for-publication appendix, including predicted business cycle statistics (standard deviations and cross-correlations of 
key macro variables); these statistics are broadly consistent with empirical statistics.  
12 
The steady state consumption share of the Ricardian household is estimated at 0.85. Estimated 
habit persistence in consumption is high (0.89), which indicates a sluggish adjustment of con-
sumption to income shocks. The risk aversion coefficient is in the range of 1.4 and the inverse of 
the elasticity of labor supply elasticity is estimated to be 2.3. The estimated price elasticity of 
aggregate imports is 2.0. The model estimates also suggest substantial nominal price and wage 
stickiness, and strong real wage rigidity. The estimated interest rate rule indicates a strong re-
sponse of the EA policy rate to domestic inflation, and a weak response to domestic output. Im-
portant in our context, the posterior estimate of the adjustment cost parameter attached to the ma-
turity structure of the private sector portfolio of government debt is 0.0009.
9
 The fiscal feedback 
rules for government transfers (not shown in Table 1) exhibit very weak responses to public debt 
and deficit levels. The estimates also suggest that most exogenous variables are highly serially 
correlated. The model properties discussed in what follows are evaluated at the posterior mode of 
the model parameters. 
 
6. QE in the unconstrained model 
This section provides results on the impact of QE for the unconstrained linearized. The discussion 
focuses on impulse responses and shock decompositions for real GDP growth and inflation. Us-
ing the unconstrained linearized model implies that the standard monetary policy (Taylor) rule is 
operational at any period of time. An operational Taylor rule offsets part of effective QE as it 
reacts to rising output growth and inflation by tightening interest rates. 
6.1. Dynamic effects of QE shocks 
Figure 1 provides impulse responses of EA endogenous variables for a positive QE shock that 
illustrate the transmission of QE in the model. More precisely, the shock is a purchase of long-
term government bonds by the central bank (CB) that is financed by additional liquidity. The 
shock is a one-time increase in CB holdings of long-term bonds and calibrated to match the quar-
terly amount of ECB purchases of around 200 billion euro, which corresponds to circa 8% of 
baseline quarterly GDP. Given the specification of QE as highly persistent AR(1), the one-time 
purchase implies a long-lasting extension of the CB's balance sheet by the given amount; only 
half of the initial balance sheet extension will be undone after 12 years.  
                                                 
9 We have tested the robustness of the parameter estimate by starting from different (lower and higher) prior values. 
The estimation has converged to the same value in both cases.  
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Note: Time intervals on the x-axis are quarters; units on the y-axis are %, except for inflation and the trade balance (both pp) and 
the short-term nominal interest rate (bp).  
Figure 1: Impulse responses for positive EA QE shock (long-term bond purchase of 8% of quarterly EA GDP) 
The purchase of long-term government debt by the CB reduces the amount of long-term debt 
available to private investors. Given the preference of private investors for a maturity mix, i.e. 
imperfect substitutability between short-term and long-term bonds, the price of long-term bonds 
rises; their expected yield, consequently, declines. The decline in the yield of long-term bonds 
leads to portfolio rebalancing towards equity and foreign assets. Higher demand for equity lowers 
the equity premium and causes an increase in private investment as shown in Figure 1. Higher 
demand for foreign assets causes depreciation of the domestic currency (an increase in the real 
exchange rate in Figure 1 corresponds to real effective depreciation), which leads to an improve-
ment in the EA trade balance. The declining yield on long-term bonds also reduces private sav-
ings as private investors are less inclined to invest into short-term bonds away from the preferred 
maturity mix in the portfolio; the decline in savings raises private consumption. The joint in-
crease in consumption, investment and net exports implies an increase in real GDP and (demand-
driven) inflation. Note that the assumption of a very persistent expansion of the CB's balance 
sheet implies a very persistent decline in the equity premium and the savings rate, which is be-
hind the very persistent increase in investment and consumption. Higher investment in productive 
capital raises the capital stock and the productivity of workers, so that labour demand and em-
ployment increase and real wages rise to some extent. Note that the efficiency of QE in Figure 1 
14 
is dampened by an offsetting response of the short-term policy rate. Given the positive impact of 
QE on activity and inflation, standard monetary policy as captured by the Taylor rule becomes 
less expansionary than in the non-QE baseline. Section 7 below will present corresponding im-
pulse responses with binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, i.e. without tightening of short-
term policy rates.        
6.2. Decomposing EA output growth and inflation 
To quantify the role of different shocks as drivers of output and inflation we plot the estimated 
contribution of the different shocks to year-on-year real GDP growth (Figure 2) and to the year-
on-year growth of the GDP deflator (Figure 3). To focus the discussion on the contribution of QE 
we group the remaining shocks coarsely in three groups: domestic demand shocks (which include 
financial shocks affecting consumption, investment and net export demand, as well as fiscal 
shocks); domestic supply shocks (productivity and price and wage mark-up shocks); and trade 
and foreign shocks (containing shocks to trade demand and mark-ups and to foreign demand and 
supply, including oil price shocks). The black solid line presents the data, the blue surface the 
contribution of the respective group of shocks.           
 
Figure 2: Decomposition of year-on-year growth of EA real GDP 
The decomposition in Figure 2 mirrors the finding by Kollmann et al. (2016) that domestic de-
mand shocks (in particular those driving investment demand) account for a large share of the 
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fluctuation in GDP growth during 1999-2016 and, in particular, the EA double-dip recession. The 
role of domestic supply shocks appears comparatively weak. Trade and foreign shocks have con-
tributed to the 2009 recession (low external demand and decline in trade), but have supported 
GDP growth in more recent years (global recovery). Finally, and most interestingly in our con-
text, the decomposition points to a positive impact of EA QE as captured in our model, i.e. taking 
into account changes in the ECB balance sheet up to 2016Q2, to EA growth. The impact of QE is 
increasing gradually given the gradual path of asset purchases and our assumption that future CB 
asset purchases are not anticipated by private investors. Even under this limiting assumption, 
Figure 2 suggests a contribution of EA QE to EA year-on-year real GDP growth of 0.3 pp on 
average in 2015q1-16q2, with the maximum of 0.4 pp in 2016q1-2.
10
                   
 
Figure 3: Decomposition of year-on-year EA CPI inflation 
The decomposition of CPI inflation in Figure 3 suggests a more balanced role for domestic de-
mand and supply shocks compared to Figure 2. The pre-crisis demand boom has added to infla-
tion pressure, whereas the following contraction of domestic demand has pushed inflation down. 
Domestic supply shocks, notably negative productivity trends and sluggish wage and price ad-
                                                 
10 Note that the panels for QE in Figures 2 and 3 show smaller positive growth and inflation contributions already 
before 2015, which are due to (smaller) variations in the CB holding of long-term debt prior to 2015 that are captured 
by the same shock but not part of the programme initiated in 2015.  
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justment, have upheld inflation more recently according to the decomposition. Trade and foreign 
shocks have negatively contributed to inflation through lower export demand during the global 
recession and falling import prices (including oil) more recently. Finally, Figure 3 points to a 
sizable contribution of QE to year-on-year EA CPI inflation, with 0.3 pp on average in 2015q1-
16q2 and a peak at 0.5 pp in 2016Q2. The sizable positive contribution of QE to real GDP growth 
(up to 0.4 pp) and inflation (up to 0.5 pp) in the EA occurs despite the fact that effective QE trig-
gers a tightening of standard monetary policy in the unconstrained linearized ("normal times") 
model. QE effects are stronger when accounting for the ZLB constraint as will be discuss in the 
following section. 
 
7. QE in the model with occasionally binding constraint 
In this section we assess the contribution of QE when we allow the zero-bound on monetary poli-
cy to be occasionally binding. A binding ZLB implies that the target ("shadow") policy rate is 
below the lower bound. By implication, an increase in output and inflation through QE or other 
factors does not lead to tightening of the short-term rate while the constraint is binding, i.e. while 
the shadow rate remains below the lower bound.   
7.1. Implementation of the occasionally binding constraint 
We use the OccBin method developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to treat the occasionally 
binding constraint via a piecewise linear solution. Moreover, we use an algorithm as in Giovan-
nini and Ratto (2017) to obtain smoothed estimates of latent variables as well as the sequence of 
regimes along the historical sample.
11
 We set the lower bound for quarterly short-term interest 
rates at 0.0.
12
 The unconstrained nominal interest rate 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐶 follows the usual Taylor rule without 
monetary shock: 
𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐶 − 𝑖̅ = 𝜌𝑖(𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 − 𝑖) + (1 − 𝜌
𝑖)(𝜂𝑖𝜋 (0.25(∑𝜋𝑘𝑡−𝑟
𝑐+𝑔
3
𝑟=0
) − ?̅?𝑐+𝑔) + 𝜂𝑖𝑦(?̃?𝑘𝑡)+𝜂
𝑖𝑝(𝑐𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑐+𝑔
)) 
As long as the actual policy rate is above the lower bound, the nominal interest rate is: 
𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐶 + 𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚 
If 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐶 ≤ 𝑖𝐿𝐵 the policy rate is constrained: 
𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑖
𝐿𝐵 + 𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚 
                                                 
11 See Giovannini and Ratto (2017) for a detailed description of the algorithm and the methodology. 
12 Previous studies on the ZLB use a slightly higher lower bound for the interest rate (around 0.2-0.4% annualized). 
In our context, this assumption would imply a constrained regime starting from 2013q4 onwards, which would imply 
a stronger impact of the asset purchase shock on real activity particularly in the years 2013 and 2014, where varia-
tions in the CB holding of long-term debt are unrelated to the 2015 QE programme.  
17 
The variable 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐶 acts as an "shadow" interest rate under a constrained regime. Under the Occbin 
algorithm, it allows to be determined endogenously when the constraint is no longer binding.
13
  
The algorithm used for estimating latent variables yields initial conditions and a sequence 
of smoothed shocks that are consistent with the observables and take into account the occasional-
ly binding constraint. The sequence of regimes is reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Estimation of the historical sequence of occasionally binding regimes from 2013q1 – 2016q2. 
Time 
Regime se-
quence1 
Starting period 
 of regime2 
2013q1 0 1 
2013q2 0 1 
2013q3 0 1 
2013q4 0 1 
2014q1 0 1 
2014q2 0  1  0 1  2  4 
2014q3 1  0 1  6 
2014q4 1  0 1  7 
2015q1 1  0 1  9 
2015q2 1  0 1  8 
2015q3 1  0 1  8 
2015q4 1  0 1  7 
2016q1 1  0 1  6 
2016q2 1  0 1  6 
Notes: (1 column) 0 = unconstrained, 1 = constrained. [1 0] indicates a constrained regime. [0 1 0] indicates a regime that 
anticipates future constraints. (2 column) Periods for which the regime starts: [1 6] indicates a constrained regime for 5 
periods. [1 2 4] indicates a regime that anticipates future constraints starting in period 2 until period 4. 
 
Based on our definition of the ZLB as zero short-term nominal interest rate, EA monetary policy 
is constrained from 2014q3 onwards, whereby agents have anticipated the ZLB since 2014q2. 
Our simulation also indicates a relatively long-lasting constrained regime. More precisely, in 
2016q2 it anticipates a constrained regime for additional 5 quarters. 
7.2. Dynamic effects of QE shocks 
Based on the sequence of regimes, we perform IRFs with ZLB that are consistent with the esti-
mated timing and duration of the constrained regime. In particular, we perform the following 
exercise: We use as a starting point the smoothed variables in 2015q1, which is a period of con-
strained monetary policy according to Table 2 and the official start of QE. We shut off all QE 
shocks and simulate the model with all other shocks. Then we perform another simulation adding 
a positive ECB QE shock of the same size as in Figure 1, i.e. long-term bond purchases of 8% of 
                                                 
13 We still use an exogenous monetary shock under the constrained regime in order to keep observing the actual 
policy rate in the data. The shock does not affect the behavior of the piecewise linear solution in terms of transmis-
sion mechanisms under the ZLB constraint. 
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steady-state quarterly EA GDP. The difference between the two simulations provides the IRF of 
the ECB QE shock under the constrained regime. Figure 4 shows the comparison of the IRFs 
between the linear (unconstrained) and piecewise linear (constrained) solution, where the former 
is represented by red and the latter by blue solid lines. 
 
 
Note: Red is the linear (unconstrained) model, blue the piecewise linear model (ZLB). The linear solution is equivalent 
to the IRFs in Figure 1.  
Figure 4: IRF for positive EA QE shock under unconstrained and constrained monetary policy 
Since we use 2015q1 as starting point of our simulations, monetary policy is constrained for 6 
quarters until the end of our sample in 2016q2. It implies that monetary policy is going back to 
‘normal’ times from 2016q3 onwards, which is reflected by an immediate jump to the uncon-
strained impulse response. The change back to the "normal regime" is the consequence of soften-
ing of contractionary forces, i.e. abating of contractionary shocks and of the effectiveness of QE 
itself, not the result of an exogenous regime switch. The IRFs suggest that the impact of the QE 
shock on real GDP (annualized 0.9 instead of 0.5 pp on impact) and inflation (annualized 0.4 
instead of 0.3 pp on impact for CPI inflation) becomes significantly larger in a zero-bound envi-
ronment. 
7.3. Decomposing EA output growth and inflation 
Finally, we investigate the shock contributions to the observed data that are consistent with the 
piecewise linear solution, i.e. the extension of the standard historical shock decompositions to the 
19 
case of occasionally binding regimes. The contribution of individual smoothed shocks is not the 
mere additive superposition of each shock in this case. Instead, it is a non-linear function of the 
whole set of shocks simultaneously affecting the economy. Hence, the contribution of one shock 
it is conditional on the sequence and combination of shocks simultaneously hitting the econo-
my.
14
 
We use the complement/residual contribution to account for the impact of the ZLB on the 
contribution of shocks to observed variables. In practice, we compute the contribution of QE by 
setting the QE shock to zero and perform simulations using initial conditions and the sequence of 
all the other shocks. The contribution of QE will be the complement/residual of this simulation to 
the smoothed variable.
15
  
Figure 5 compares the contribution of QE on year-on-year real GDP growth and CPI in-
flation in the EA under the linear (unconstrained) solution and the piecewise linear (ZLB con-
straint) solution, respectively. Accounting for the temporarily binding ZLB strengthens the posi-
tive contribution of QE to real GDP growth and inflation in 2015-16. The average impact of QE 
on year-on-year real GDP growth in 2015q1-16q2 more than doubles from 0.3 to 0.7 pp, and the 
maximum impact increases from 0.4 to 1.0 pp in 2016q2, which suggests that QE is much more 
effective under the constrained monetary policy regime. The impact on year-on-year CPI infla-
tion rises from 0.3 to 0.4 pp for the 2015q1-16q2 average, and the maximum impact increases 
from 0.5 to 0.7 pp in 2016q2. The more positive contribution under the ZLB owes particularly to 
the absence in this context of the countervailing monetary policy tightening that would occur in 
"normal" times. 
 
                                                 
14 In general, we can consider two definitions that generalize the concept of shock contributions in the non-linear 
case, which degenerate to the standard shock decomposition for the linear case: The conditional contribution and the 
complement contribution. See Giovannini and Ratto (2017) for a detailed description of both methods. 
15 Note that each of these simulations provides a different sequence of regimes, which in general will be different 
from the historical one. The complement/residual contribution triggers key non-linear features associated to the in-
teraction between shock realization and the occasionally binding constraints. 
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Note: Real GDP growth and CPI inflation are both shown as deviations from steady state, which is calibrated as the mean 
over the sample period from 1999q1-2016q2. In both sub-plots 0.01 on the y-axis corresponds to 1 pp. 
Figure 5: QE contribution to year-on-year EA real GDP growth and CPI inflation in linear and piecewise 
linear solution 
 
The effects of QE on EA GDP and inflation in our estimated model are comparable to existing 
literature for EA QE and comparable in order of magnitude to results from similar exercises for 
the US QE: Sahuc (2016) find effects of ECB QE (9% of EA GDP) on EA real GDP growth (in-
flation) of 0.2 (0.1 pp) in 2015-6 for short-term rates constant in 2015, whereas keeping the poli-
cy rate unchanged for another year raises the average growth (inflation) effect in 2015-6 to 0.6 pp 
(0.6 pp). For the US, Chen et al. (2016) report GDP growth (inflation) effects of 0.1 pp (0.3 pp) 
of US QE measures of a volume of 4 pp of GDP. De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016) report GDP 
growth (inflation) effects of 0.6 pp (0.3 pp) of the Federal Reserve's "Operation Twist" (2%-of-
GDP). Both studies work with scenarios in which short-term policy rates do not respond (imme-
diately) to higher growth and inflation. Gertler and Karadi (2013) quantify the impact of US 
LSAP with a volume of 2.5% of GDP on output growth (inflation) to 1 pp (1.5 pp) if policy rates 
remain unchanged, and 0.2 pp (0.2 pp) if the standard monetary policy rule is active and partly 
offsets expansionary QE effects. 
21 
8. Conclusion 
We have introduced imperfect substitutability between bonds of different maturities and central 
bank balance sheet operations in a New Keynesian open-economy DSGE model. We have esti-
mated a two-region (EA and rest of the world) version of the model to assess the impact of the 
ECB’s large-scale asset purchase programme (QE) on economic activity and inflation in the EA. 
The detailed modelling of QE and portfolio adjustment enables us to capture a large number of 
the transmission channels put forward in the literature, including the saving, financing cost, ex-
change rate, inflation, and fiscal channels. We use data on government debt stocks and yields 
across maturities to identify the parameter that governs portfolio adjustment in the private sector 
and yield, exchange rate and savings effects of central bank asset purchases. The shock decompo-
sitions for year-on-year real GDP growth and CPI inflation in the EA suggest a positive average 
contribution of ECB QE to EA output growth and inflation of 0.3 and 0.3 pp during 2015q1-16q2 
in the standard unconstrained ("normal times") model and 0.7 and 0.4 pp respectively in the mod-
el that accounts for the temporarily binding zero-bound constraint. 
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APPENDIX: MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
We introduce elements of quantitative easing into a two-region world consisting of the Euro Area 
(EA) and the rest of the world (RoW). The EA region is rather detailed, while the RoW block, 
which also includes US, is more stylized.
16
 
The EA region assumes two (representative) households, a number of layers of firms and a gov-
ernment. EA households provide labor services to firms. One of the two households (savers, or 
'Ricardians') in each country has access to financial markets, and she owns her country’s firms. 
The other (liquidity-constrained, or 'non-Ricardian') household has no access to financial mar-
kets, does not own financial or physical capital, and in each period only consumes the disposable 
wage and transfer income. The preferences of both types of household exhibit habit formation in 
both consumption and leisure, a feature which allows for better capturing persistence of the data. 
There is a monopolistically-competitive sector producing differentiated goods, using domestic 
labor and capital. The firms in the sector maximize the present value of dividends at a discount 
factor that is strictly larger than the risk-free rate and varies over time. This is a short-cut for cap-
turing financial frictions facing firms; it can, e.g., be interpreted as a ‘principal agent friction’ 
between the owner and the management of the firm. Optimization is subject to investment and 
labor adjustment costs and a varying capacity utilization rate, which lets the model better capture 
the dynamics of the current account and other macro variables. 
Total output is produced by combining the domestic differentiated goods bundle with energy in-
put. EA wages are set by monopolistic trade unions. Nominal differentiated goods prices are 
sticky as are the wages paid to the workers. Fiscal authorities in the EA impose distortive taxes 
and issue debt.  
The RoW block is simplified compared to the EA block. Specifically, the RoW consists of a 
budget constraint for the representative household, demand functions for domestic and imported 
goods (derived from CES consumption good aggregators), a production technology that uses la-
                                                 
16The EA block builds on, but is considerably different than the QUEST model of the EU economy (Ratto et al., 
2009). 
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bor as the sole factor input, and a New Keynesian Phillips curve. The RoW block abstracts from 
capital accumulation. 
The behavioral relationships and technology are subject to autocorrelated shocks denoted by 𝜀𝑡
𝑥 , 
where x stands for the type of shock. 𝜀𝑡
𝑥 will generally follow an AR(1) process with autocorrela-
tion coefficient 𝜌𝑥 < 1 and innovation 𝑢𝑡
𝑥: 
(𝜀𝑡
𝑥) = 𝜌𝑥(𝜀𝑡
𝑥) + 𝑢𝑡
𝑥 
There is also a separate category of shocks, denoted 𝐴𝑡
𝑥, whose logs are integrated of order 1.
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With the exception of the TFP shocks, these shocks are modelled as ARIMA(1,1,0) shocks.
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We next present a detailed description of the EA block, followed by an overview of the RoW 
model block. Throughout the derivation the following indexing convention will be preserved. 
Indices i and j index firms and households, respectively. These indices will usually be dropped 
when the equilibrium conditions are derived due to the representative household/firm assumption. 
Index l indicates sovereign states or economic regions. Finally, index k will always indicate the 
'domestic' economy. This index will be generally dropped for parameters (even if they are coun-
try-specific), but will be usually preserved for variables. 
 
A.1. EA households 
The household sector consists of a continuum of households 𝑗 ∈ [0; 1]. There are two types of 
households, savers ("Ricardians", superscript s) who own firms and hold government and foreign 
bonds and liquidity-constrained households (subscript c) whose only income is labor income and 
who do not save. The share of savers in the population is 𝜔𝑠. 
Both households enjoy utility from consumption 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟  and incur disutility from labor 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟  
(𝑟 = 𝑠, 𝑐). On top of this, Ricardian's utility depends also on the financial assets held. 
Date t expected life-time utility of household r, is defined as: 
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟 = ∑𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑐 𝛽𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
𝑢𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟 (∙) 
where 𝛽 is the (non-stochastic) discount factor (common for both types of households) and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑐  is 
the saving shock. 
A.1.1. Ricardian households 
                                                 
17 These, in particular, include the TFP shock and the final demand productivity shocks. 
18 TFP is driven by 3 shocks, see below. 
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The Ricardian households work, consume, own firms and receive nominal transfers 𝑇𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠  from the 
government. Ricardians have full access to financial markets and are the only households who 
own financial assets 
𝐴𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡
 is consumption price, including VAT.
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 Financial wealth 
of household j consists of bonds 
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 and shares 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆  is the nominal price of shares 
in t and 𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡 the number of shares held by the household. It is assumed that households invest 
only in domestic shares. 
𝐴𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 =
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 +
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡  
Bonds consist of domestic government bonds 
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑡
𝑔
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡, foreign bonds 
𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡 𝐵𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑔
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡  and private risk-free 
bonds 
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 (in zero supply):  
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 =
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 + ∑ 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑔
𝑙
 
with 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡 the bilateral exchange rate and 𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑡 ≡ 1.
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Total government bonds consist of long-term bonds 
,g L
jkktB  and short-term bonds
,Sg
jkktB : 
, ,g g L g S
jkkt jkkt jkktB B B   
From the outstanding long-term bonds 
, ,g L H
jkktB  are held by the private sector and 
, ,g L CB
jkktB  by the 
central bank: 
, , , , ,g L g L H g L CB
jkkt jkkt jkktB B B   
Short-term and long-term bonds are imperfect substitutes in the model. In particular, households 
have a preference for holding a mix of short-term and long-term bonds, and deviations from the 
target value   for the ratio of long-term over short-term debt induce quadratic adjustment costs (
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 Note that 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡
 is related to 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 , the private consumption deflator in terms of input factors, by the formula: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 = (1 + 𝜏𝑘
𝐶)𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶  where 𝜏𝑐 is the tax on consumption. 
20 For simplicity, at this moment the model assumes only one type of foreign bonds, 𝐵𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
, issued by RoW and 
denominated in RoW currency. 
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b ). The same formulation of portfolio preferences or adjustment costs has been used previously 
by, e.g., Andrés et al. (2004), Falagiarda (2013), Harrison (2012), and Liu et al. (2015). 
The budget constraint of a Ricardian household j is given by: 
   
,, , ,
, 12 1
, ,
,
1 1
,
,
1
1
1 ( 1) (1 )
2 (1 )
1
g SN g L H g S g S
kk t N skt kkt b kkt lkt lkt t
kt jktg L H g
kkt t
g L H
c vat s
kt jkt Y Y Y Y
kt kt kt kt
rf rf S Y s s
t jkt kt kt kt j
kkt
kt kt jkt jkt Y
kt
BP B B e B B
W N
B i
cB
P C
P P P P
i B P P d S div T tax
P

 





 
 
       

     
 
  
, ,
1
N g L H
b k
k
t t
Y
k
t
kP
P
B   
where 𝑊𝑘𝑡 is the nominal wage rate, 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 , is GDP price deflator, 𝑖𝑙𝑡−1
𝑔
 are interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds of region l, 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑟𝑓
 is interest rate on risk-free bond, 𝑇𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠  are government transfers to 
savers and 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑡 are lump-sum taxes paid by savers. Note that savers own all the firms in the 
economy. 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑘𝑡 represent the profits of all firms other than differentiated goods producers (the 
latter producers transfer profits to savers by paying dividends 𝑑𝑘𝑡). 
The price in period t of a short-term (1-period) bond of nominal value ,g SkktB  is 
, / (1 )g S gkkt tB i , with 
g
ti  being the short-term nominal interest rate. Following Woodford (2001) long-term government 
debt is modelled through bonds for which the nominal coupon c, which is a fraction of the princi-
pal, depreciates over time at rate b . The price in period t of a long-term bond issued in t (
N
ktP ) 
equals the discounted value of future payments: 
1
0 (1 )
nT
N b
kt g n
n
P c
i





  
where T is the maturity period of the bond. 
We define the gross nominal return on domestic shares as: 
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑠 =
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑆  
The instantaneous utility functions of savers, 𝑢𝑠(∙), is defined as: 
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𝑢𝑠 (𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 , 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 ,
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 )
=
1
1 − 𝜃
(𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )
1−𝜃
−
𝜔𝑁𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑈
1 + 𝜃𝑁
(𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 )1−𝜃(𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )
1+𝜃𝑁
− (𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )−𝜃  
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡  
where 𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 = ∫𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 , 𝐶𝑘𝑡 = 𝜔
𝑠𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 + (1 − 𝜔𝑠)𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑐  ; ℎ, ℎ𝑁 ∈ (0; 1) measure the strength of the ex-
ternal habits in consumption and labor and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑈 is the labor supply (or wage mark-up) shock . The 
disutility of holding financial assets, 𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴 , is defined as: 
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴 = ∑((𝛼𝑙𝑘
𝑏𝐵0 + 𝜀𝑙𝑘𝑡−1
𝐵 ) 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡−1𝐵
𝑔
𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡−1)
𝑙
+ 
((𝛼𝑘
𝑠𝑆0 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡−1
𝑆 ) 𝑃𝑠𝑡−1
𝑠  𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡−1) 
The Ricardian household problem leads to the following first order conditions (FOC).
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The FOC w.r.t. savers' consumption produces: 
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐶 (𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )−𝜃 = 𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠  
where 𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. 
FOC w.r.t. domestic risk-free bond: 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡] = 1 
FOC w.r.t. domestic short-term government bonds: 
, ,
1
,
1 1( ) ( ) ( 1)
1
s g S
Nkt kkt
t t b kts g g L H
kt t kk
k
k t
Y
t
Y
t
BP
P
E E P
i B

   


 
   
 
 
FOC w.r.t. domestic long-term government bonds: 
, , ,
21
, , , , , ,
1
1( ) ( ) 1 ( 1) ( 1)
2
s N g S g S g S
kt kt b kkt kkt kkt
t t bs N g L H g L H g L H
kt b kt k
Y
k
kt kkt kkt
t
Y
kt
P
P
P B B B
E E
P c B B B
 
    
 


 
     
  
 
FOC w.r.t. RoW government bonds: 
                                                 
21 See subsection A.1.3 for the labor supply condition. 
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𝛽𝐸𝑡
[
 
 
 
 
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠
(1 + 𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
)
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡+1
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡 
− 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝐵 − (𝛼𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘
𝑏0 + 𝛼𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘
𝑏1 𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡𝐵𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
𝑃𝑘
𝑌𝑌𝑘 
)
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡
]
 
 
 
 
= 1 
 
where 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝐵  the risk-premium on RoW bonds. 
FOC w.r.t. domestic stocks: 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠
(1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠 ) − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑆 − 𝛼𝑘𝑘
𝑠0
1 + 𝜋𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 ] = 1 
 
where 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑆  the risk-premium on stocks. The above optimality conditions are similar to a textbook 
Euler equation, but incorporate asset-specific risk premia, which depend on an exogenous shock 
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐴  as well as the size of the asset holdings as a share of GDP. Taking into account the Euler 
equation for the risk-free bond and approximating, they simplify to the familiar expressions: 
𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑔
= 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
+ 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 
𝐸𝑡 [
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡+1
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡 
] 𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
= 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
+ 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 
𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
+ 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑠  
In the equations above, 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 is the risk premium on domestic government bonds. Similarly, 
𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 is the risk premium on domestic government bonds sold abroad (to RoW). This 
feature of the model, hence, helps capture international spillovers that occur via the financial 
market channel, see Vitek (2013, 2014). Finally, 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑠  is a crucial risk premium on domestic 
shares. It is introduced to capture in a stylized manner financial frictions that are commonly be-
lieved to have contributed to the first phase of the financial crisis and may have contributed to its 
second phase, see also subsection A.2.2, below.
22
 
  
                                                 
22 Observationally, this approach is equivalent to exogenous risk premia as well as risk premia derived in the spirit of 
Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist. 
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A.1.2. Liquidity-constrained household 
The liquidity-constrained household consumes her disposable after-tax wage and transfer income 
in each period of time ('hand-to-mouth'). The period t budget constraint of the liquidity-
constrained household is: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑘
𝐶)𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑘𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑇𝑘𝑡
𝑐 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑗𝑘𝑡. 
The instantaneous utility functions for liquidity-constrained households. 𝑢𝑐(∙), is defined as: 
𝑢𝑐(𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 , 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 ) =
1
1 − 𝜃
(𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 − ℎ𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑐 )
1−𝜃
− (𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑐 )1−𝜃
𝜔𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝑈 )
1 + 𝜃𝑁
(𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 − ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑡−1
𝑐 )
1+𝜃𝑁
 
with 𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑐 = ∫𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 . 
 
A.1.3. Labor supply 
Trade unions are maximizing a joint utility function for each type of labor. It is assumed that 
types of labor are distributed equally over Ricardian and liquidity-constrained households with 
their respective population weights. The wage rule is obtained by equating a weighted average of 
the marginal utility of leisure to a weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption times 
the real wage adjusted for a wage mark-up. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced in the 
form of adjustment costs for changing wages. The wage adjustment costs are borne by the house-
hold. Real wage rigidity is also allowed, given the following optimality condition: 
((1 + 𝜇𝑡
𝑤)
𝜔𝑠𝑉1−𝑙,𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 +(1−𝜔𝑠)𝑉1−𝑙,𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐
𝜔𝑠𝑈𝑐,𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 +(1−𝜔𝑠)𝑈𝑐,𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 (1 + 𝜏𝑘
𝐶)𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝐶 )
1−𝛾𝑤𝑟
((1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)
𝑊𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 )
𝛾𝑤𝑟
= (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 +
𝛾𝑤(𝜋𝑡
𝑤 − (1 − 𝑠𝑓𝑤)𝜋𝑡−1
𝑤 )(1 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑤)-𝛾𝑤
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐿𝑡
1+𝜋𝑡+1
𝑦
1+𝑖𝑡+1
𝑠𝑑 (𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 − (1 − 𝑠𝑓𝑤)𝜋𝑡
𝑤)(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 ) 
where 𝜇𝑡
𝑤 is the wage mark-up, 𝛾𝑤𝑟 is the degree of real wage rigidity, 𝛾𝑤 is the degree of nomi-
nal wage rigidity and 𝑠𝑓𝑤 is the degree of forward-lookingness in the labor supply equation. 
𝑉𝑁,𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑥 , for x=s,c, is the marginal disutility of labor, defined as: 
𝑉𝑁,𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑥 = 𝜔𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝑈 )𝐶𝑘𝑡
1−𝜃(𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑥 − ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑡−1
𝑥 )
𝜃𝑁
 
 
A.2. EA production sector 
A.2.1. Total output demand 
Total output 𝑂𝑘𝑡 is produced by perfectly competitive firms by combining value added, 𝑌𝑘𝑡, with 
energy input, 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡, using the following CES production function: 
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𝑂𝑘𝑡 = [(1 − 𝑠
𝑂𝑖𝑙)
1
𝜎𝑜(𝑌𝑘𝑡)
𝜎𝑜−1
𝜎𝑜 + (𝑠𝑂𝑖𝑙)
1
𝜎𝑜(𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡)
𝜎𝑜−1
𝜎𝑜 ]
𝜎𝑜
𝜎𝑜−1
 
where 𝑠𝑂𝑖𝑙 is the energy input share in total output and elasticity 𝜎𝑜 is inversely related to the 
steady state output price gross mark-up. It follows that the demand for 𝑌𝑘𝑡 and 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡 by total 
output producers is, respectively: 
𝑌𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝑠
𝑂𝑖𝑙) (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )
−𝜎𝑜
𝑂𝑘𝑡 
𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡 = 𝑠
𝑂𝑖𝑙 (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )
−𝜎𝑜
𝑂𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  and 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙are price deflators associated with 𝑌𝑘𝑡 and 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡, respectively, and the total 
output deflator 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂  is such that: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 = [(1 − 𝑠𝑂𝑖𝑙)(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )1−𝜎
𝑜
+ 𝑠𝑂𝑖𝑙(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙)
1−𝜎𝑜
]
1
1−𝜎𝑜
 
 
A.2.2. Differentiated goods supply 
Each firm 𝑖 ∈ [0; 1] produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for 
varieties produced by other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are monopolistical-
ly competitive in the goods market and face a downward-sloping demand function for goods. 
Domestic final good producers then combine the different varieties into a homogenous good and 
sell them to domestic final demand goods producers and exporters. 
Differentiated goods are produced using total capital 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡  and labour 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 which are combined 
in a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡)
𝛼(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡 )1−𝛼 
where 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌  is labour-augmenting productivity shock common to all firms in the differentiated 
goods sector and 𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 is firm-specific level of capital utilization. Total Factor Productivity, 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑘𝑡, can therefore be defined as: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑘𝑡 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )𝛼. 
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We allow for three types of shocks related to the technology: a temporary shock 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑌 which ac-
counts for temporary deviations of 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌  from its trend, ?̅?𝑘𝑡
𝑌 , and two shocks related to the trend 
components itself: 
log(𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̅?𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) =  𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑌 
log(?̅?𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̅?𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 ) =  𝑔𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐿𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅  
𝑔𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜌𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑔𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐺𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜌𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ )𝑔𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅  
with 𝑔𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅  being the long-run technology growth. 
Total capital is a sum of private installed capital, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡, and public capital, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑔
: 
𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 
The producers maximize the value of the firm, 𝑉𝑘𝑡, equal to a discounted stream of future divi-
dends, 𝑉𝑘𝑡 = 𝑑𝑘𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡[𝑠𝑑𝑓𝑘𝑡+1𝑉𝑘𝑡+1], with the stochastic discount factor 
𝑠𝑑𝑓𝑘𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑠𝑑) (1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡)⁄ ≈ (1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑟𝑓
+ 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 ) (1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡)⁄  
which depends directly on the investment risk premium, 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 . The dividends are defined 
as: 
𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝐾) (
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 −
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝜏𝑘
𝐾𝛿
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 −
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 is physical investment, 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼  is investment price, 𝜏𝑘
𝐾 is the profit tax, 𝛿 is capital depre-
ciation rate and 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡 are adjustment costs associated with price 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌  and labour input 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 ad-
justment or moving capacity utilization 𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 and investment 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 away from their optimal level:  
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡)  
where 
𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) =
𝛾𝑝
2
𝑌𝑘𝑡 (
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 − 1)
2
 
𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) =
𝛾𝑛
2
𝑌𝑘𝑡 (
𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
− 1)
2
 
𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡) =
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 (𝛾
𝑢,1(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 1) +
𝛾𝑢,2
2
(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 1)
2) 
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𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡) =
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 (
𝛾𝐼,1
2
𝐾𝑘𝑡−1 (
𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐾𝑘𝑡−1
− 𝛿)
2
+
𝛾𝐼,2
2
(𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡−1)
2
𝐾𝑘𝑡−1
) 
 
The maximization is subject to production function, standard capital accumulation equation: 
𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 
and the usual demand condition which inversely links demand for variety i goods and the price of 
the variety: 
𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )
−𝜎𝑦
𝑌𝑘𝑡 
Let 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑋,𝑖𝑘𝑡 for 𝑋 = 𝑃
𝑌, 𝑁, 𝑐𝑢, 𝐼 denote additional dynamic terms due to the existence of adjust-
ment costs. Let also define 𝑔𝑘𝑡
𝑋 : =
𝑋𝑘𝑡−𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
 the net growth rate of variable 𝑋 = 𝑁, 𝑌, 𝐼, 𝐶, … and 
𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑋 : =
∆𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑋  the inflation rate of a price deflator associated with variable 𝑋 = 𝑁, 𝑌, 𝐼, 𝐶, … The 
main optimality conditions of the differentiated goods producers are as follows. 
The usual equality between the marginal product of labor and labor cost holds, with a wedge 
driven by the labor adjustment costs: 
𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦 𝛼
𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑘𝑡
− 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑁,𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏
𝑘)
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  
with 𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦
 being inversely related to the price mark-up. The capital optimality condition reflects the 
usual dynamic trade-off faced by the firm: 
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑦
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠𝑑
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝐼 𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌⁄
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌⁄
(𝜇𝑘𝑡+1
𝑦 (1 − 𝛼)
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌 𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝐼 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 𝜏
𝑘𝛿 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐𝑢 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡⁄ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑘𝑡+1) = 𝑄𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑄𝑘𝑡 has the usual Tobin's interpretation. 
FOC w.r.t. investment implies that Tobin's Q varies due to the existence of investment adjust-
ment costs: 
𝑄𝑘𝑡 = 1 + 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐼,𝑖𝑘𝑡 
Firms adjust their capacity utilization depending on the conditions on the market via the optimali-
ty condition: 
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𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌⁄
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑐𝑢𝑘𝑡
= 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑐𝑢,𝑖𝑘𝑡 
Finally, the FOC w.r.t. differentiated output price pins down the price mark-up: 
𝜎𝑦
(𝜎𝑦 − 1)
𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘) +
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑃𝑌,𝑖𝑘𝑡
(𝜎𝑦 − 1)
+  𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜇
 
with 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜇
 being the markup shock. The latter equation, combined with the FOC w.r.t. labor implies 
the Phillips curve of the familiar form. 
 
A.3. Trade 
A.3.1. Import sector 
Aggregate demand components 
The final aggregate demand component goods 𝐶𝑘𝑡 (private consumption good), 𝐼𝑘𝑡, (private in-
vestment good) 𝐺𝑘𝑡 (government consumption good) and 𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝐺  (government investment good) are 
produced by perfectly competitive firms by combining domestic output, 𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍  with imported goods 
𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 , 𝑍 = 𝐶, 𝐼, 𝐺, 𝐼𝐺, using the following CES production function: 
𝑍𝑘𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧 [(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑠𝑀,𝑍)
1
𝜎𝑧(𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
𝜎𝑧−1
𝜎𝑧 + (𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑠𝑀,𝑍)
1
𝜎𝑧(𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
𝜎𝑧−1
𝜎𝑧 ]
𝜎𝑧
𝜎𝑧−1
 
with 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧
 a shock to productivity in the sector producing goods Z and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀  is a shock to the share 
𝑠𝑀,𝑍 of imports in domestic demand components. We assume that the log difference of the spe-
cific productivities, 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧
 is an AR(1), 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧
 with mean 𝑔𝑝
𝑧
. It follows that the demand for the do-
mestic and foreign part of demand aggregates is: 
𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧)
𝜎𝑧−1
(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑠𝑀,𝑍) (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
−𝜎𝑧
𝑍𝑘𝑡 
𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧)
𝜎𝑧−1
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑠𝑀,𝑍 (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
−𝜎𝑧
𝑍𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍  are price deflators associated with 𝑍𝑘𝑡; they satisfy: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧)
−1
[(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑠𝑀,𝑍)(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )1−𝜎
𝑧
+ 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑠𝑀,𝑍(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀)1−𝜎
𝑧
]
1
1−𝜎𝑧 
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Economy-specific final imports demand 
Final imported goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms combining economy-specific 
homogenous imports goods, 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡, using CES production function: 
𝑀𝑘𝑡 = (∑(𝑠𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 )
1
𝜎𝐹𝑀
𝑙
(𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡)
𝜎𝐹𝑀−1
𝜎𝐹𝑀 )
𝜎𝐹𝑀
𝜎𝐹𝑀−1
 
where 𝜎𝐹𝑀 is the price elasticity of demand for country l's goods and ∑ 𝑠𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑙 = 1 are import 
shares. The demand for goods from country l is then: 
𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡 = 𝑠𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 (
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀 )
−𝜎𝐹𝑀
𝑀𝑘𝑡 
while the imports price: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀 = (∑𝑠𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 (𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 )1−𝜎
𝐹𝑀
𝑙
)
1
1−𝜎𝐹𝑀
 
with 𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀  being the country-specific imports good prices. 
 
Supply of economy- and sector-specific imports 
The homogenous goods from country l are assembled by monopolistically competitive firms 
from economy- and sector- specific goods using a linear production function and subject to ad-
justment costs. All products from country l are initially purchased at export price 𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋 of this coun-
try. Firms then maximize a discounted stream of profits, 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑀, such that : 
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑀 = 
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡 − 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑀  
where 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑀  are the adjustment costs that producers face when choosing the bilateral import 
price.
23
 The maximization is subject to the usual inversely-sloping demand equation. These as-
sumptions result in a simple expression for price 𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀  of homogenous goods from country l: 
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗
𝑀,𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑀  
where 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑀,𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑀  are additional dynamic terms due to costs of adjustment. 
 
A.3.2. Export sector 
The exporting firms are supposed to be competitive and set their prices equal to the output price, 
up to a shock, 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑋 : 
                                                 
23 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑀 =
𝛾𝑝𝑀
2
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡−1 (
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡−1
𝑀 − 1)
2
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𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 = 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂  
 
A.4.1. Monetary policy 
The operating profit of the central bank equals the sum of base money issuance and interest in-
come minus the current expenditure on buying long-term bonds, where the latter equals the 
change of the value of long-term bonds on the central bank's balance sheet: 
, , , , , ,
, 1 , 1( )
CB g L CB N g L CB N g L CB
kt kt jkk t kt jkkt b kt jkk tPR M cB P B P B      
Under the central bank's budget constraint, purchases of long-term government bonds can be fi-
nanced either by increasing liquidity (money issuance), or by reducing the central bank's operat-
ing profit.
24
 Purchases of long-term bonds by the central bank are modelled as an exogenous path 
that replicates the announced ECB programme in timing and size. 
Monetary policy in "normal times" is modelled by a Taylor rule where the ECB sets the policy 
rate 𝑖𝑘𝑡 in response to area-wide inflation and real GDP growth. The policy rate adjusts sluggish-
ly to deviations of inflation and GDP growth from their respective target levels; it is also subject 
to random shocks:  
𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝑖̅ = 𝜌
𝑖(𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 − 𝑖) + (1 − 𝜌
𝑖)(𝜂𝑖𝜋 (0.25(∑𝜋𝑘𝑡−𝑟
𝑐+𝑔
3
𝑟=0
) − ?̅?𝑐+𝑔) + 𝜂𝑖𝑦(?̃?𝑘𝑡)+𝜂
𝑖𝑝(𝑐𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑐 ))
+ 𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚 
where 𝑖 = 𝑟 + 𝜋𝑐+𝑔 is the steady state nominal interest rate, equal to the sum of the steady state 
real interest rate and CPI inflation, ?̃?𝑘𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑘𝑡) − ?̅?𝑘𝑡 is the output gap with ?̅?𝑡 as (log) poten-
tial output, 𝑐𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑐+𝑔
= 𝑐𝜋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑐+𝑔
+ 0.25(𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑐+𝑔
− ?̅?𝑐+𝑔) is the cumulated inflation gap as a proxy for a 
form of forward-guidance or price level target. The Taylor rule may be extended to deal with 
economies with managed exchange rates and other exchange rate regimes. It is assumed that the 
risk-free rate is equal to the policy rate: 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑠𝑑 ≡ 𝑖𝑘𝑡 . 
 
A.4.2. Fiscal policy 
Government expenditure and receipts can deviate temporarily from their long-run levels in sys-
tematic response to budgetary or business-cycle conditions and in response to idiosyncratic 
shocks. Concerning government consumption and government investment, we specify the follow-
ing autoregressive equations: 
                                                 
24 A third option, in general, is for the central bank to sell other assets from its portfolio to sterilise the impact of its 
intervention on the central bank balance sheet. We discard this possibility in our model by limiting central bank as-
sets to long-term government bonds. 
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𝐺𝑘𝑡
?̅?𝑘𝑡𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝐺 − ?̅? = 𝜌
𝐺 (
𝐺𝑘𝑡−1
?̅?𝑘𝑡𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝐺 − ?̅?) + 𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝐺  
𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝐺
?̅?𝑘𝑡𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝐼 − 𝐼
?̅? = 𝜌𝐼𝐺 (
𝐼𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺
?̅?𝑘𝑡𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝐼 − 𝐼
?̅?) + 𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺 
𝑇𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘𝑡
− ?̅? = 𝜌𝑇 (
𝑇𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘𝑡
− ?̅?) + 𝜂𝐷𝐸𝐹,𝑇 (
Δ𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
− 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑇) + 𝜂𝐵,𝑇 (
𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
− ?̅?𝑘
𝐺) + 𝑢𝑘𝑡
𝑇  
with 𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑡
 total nominal government debt. Government transfers react to the level of government 
debt and the government deficit relative to the associated debt and deficit targets ?̅?𝑘
𝐺 and 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑇.  
The government budget constraint is 
, ,,
, 1, 1
( )
(1 )
g S N g LN g S CB
jkk G Gt b kt jkk tg Lkt kt kt
jk
IG G
kt kt kt kktY Y Y Y Y
kt kt kt k
t kt k
t kt kt
t
B P c BP B PR
B
i P P P
P
P P
R G P I T
       

 
where government (nominal) revenue: 
𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝐺 = 𝜏𝑘
𝐾(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡 − 𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑘𝑡 − 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝛿𝑘𝐾𝑘𝑡−1) + 𝜏
𝑁𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏
𝐶 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑘𝑡 + 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡 
consists of taxes on consumption, labor and corporate income as well as lump-sum tax. 
Finally, the accumulation equation for government capital is: 
𝐾𝑘𝑡
𝐺 = (1 − 𝛿𝐺 )𝐾𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺 + 𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝐺  
 
 A.5. The RoW block 
The model of the RoW economy (subscript k=RoW) is a simplified structure with fewer shocks. 
Specifically, the RoW consists of a budget constraint for the representative household, demand 
functions for domestic and imported goods (derived from CES consumption good aggregators), a 
production technology that uses labor as the sole factor input, and a New Keynesian Phillips 
curve. The RoW block abstracts from capital accumulation. There are shocks to labor productivi-
ty, price mark-ups, the subjective discount rate, the relative preference for domestic vs. imported 
goods, as well as monetary policy shocks in the RoW. 
More specifically the budget constraint for the RoW representative household is: 
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 − ∑
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋𝑀𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑙
 
where 𝑋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 are non-oil exports by the RoW, and the intertemporal equation for aggregate de-
mand derived from the FOC for consumption: 
𝛽𝑡
𝜆𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡+1
𝜆𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
1 + 𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
1 + 𝜋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡+1
𝐶 = 1 
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with 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽exp (𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 ),  (𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡−1)
−𝜃
= 𝜆𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 and 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶  as the RoW demand shock. 
Note that 
𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 ≡ 𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 
As for the EA, final aggregate demand 𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 (in the absence of investment and government 
spending in the RoW block) is a combination of domestic output, 𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 and imported goods, 
𝑀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡, using the following CES function: 
𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑝 [(1 − 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑀)
1
𝜎(𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 )
𝜎−1
𝜎 + (𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑀)
1
𝜎(𝑀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 )
𝜎−1
𝜎 ]
𝜎
𝜎−1
 
which gives the demand for the domestic and foreign goods in RoW demand: 
𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 = (𝐴𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑝 )
𝜎−1
(1 − 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑀) (
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 )
−𝜎
𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 
𝑀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 = (𝐴𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑝 )
𝜎−1
𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑀 (
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 )
−𝜎
𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 
where the consumer price deflator 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶   satisfies: 
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 = (𝐴𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑝 )
−1
[(1 − 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑀)(𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌 )1−𝜎 + 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑀(𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑀 )1−𝜎]
1
1−𝜎 
The RoW non-oil output is produced with the technology: 
𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌 𝑁𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 
Price setting for RoW non-oil output follows a New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
𝜋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑌 = 𝛽
𝜆𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡+1
𝜆𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
(𝑠𝑓𝑝(𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡+1
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑌 ) + (1 − 𝑠𝑓𝑝)(𝜋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡−1
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑌 ))
+ 𝜑𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑌 ln(𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 − ?̅?𝑅𝑜𝑊) + 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌  
Monetary policy in the RoW follows the Taylor rule: 
𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 − 𝑖̅ = 𝜌
𝑖(𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡−1 − 𝑖)̅ + (1 − 𝜌
𝑖)(𝜂𝑖𝜋(𝜋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑌 ) + 𝜂𝑖𝑦?̃?𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡) + 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚  
where ?̃?𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 is the deviation of actual output from trend output. 
The RoW net foreign asset (NFA) position equals minus the EA NFA position.  
Finally, oil is assumed to be fully imported from the RoW and the oil price is assumed as follows: 
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 =
?̅?𝑌
𝐴𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝑈𝑆
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙
 is oil-specific productivity and oil is priced in USD. 
Total nominal exports are defined as: 
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 = ∑𝑃𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑋 𝑀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑙𝑡
𝑙
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with the bilateral export price being defined as the domestic price subject to a bilateral price 
shock: 
𝑃𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑋 = exp (𝜀𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑋 ) 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌  
 
A.6 Closing the economy 
 
Market clearing requires that: 
𝑌𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝐼𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐺𝑘𝑡 + 𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑡 
Export is a sum of imports from the domestic economy by other countries: 
𝑋𝑘𝑡 = ∑𝑀𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑙
 
where 𝑀𝑘𝑙𝑡 stands for imports from the domestic economy to economy l. The total imports are 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡 
where non-oil imports 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀(𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼 + 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺) 
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘,𝑡𝐵𝑘,𝑡
𝑤 = +(1 + 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑏𝑤 )𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘,𝑡𝐵𝑘,𝑡−1
𝑤 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑘𝑡 − ∑
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘
𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑙
− 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑘𝑡 − ∑
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘
𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑙 − 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑡  defines the trade balance, with domes-
tic importers buying the imported good at the price Plt
X .We allow non-zero trade balance and in-
clude an international transfer, 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝑘, calibrated in order to satisfy zero NFA in equilibrium. 
Finally, net foreign assets of each country sum to zero: 
∑𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑙
= 0. 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙 is the relative size of economy l. 
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APPENDIX: DATA  
 
1. Data sources 
Data for the EA (quarterly national accounts, fiscal aggregates, quarterly interest and exchange 
rates) are taken from Eurostat. ROW series are constructed on the basis of the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases.  
2. Constructing of data series for ROW variables 
Series for GDP and prices in the ROW starting in 1999 are constructed on the basis of data for 
the following 59 countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, 
Georgia, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,  Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, 
Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The ROW data are annu-
al data from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) databases.  
3. List of observables 
The estimation uses the following time series for the EA: GDP, GDP deflator, population, total 
employment, employment rate, employment in hours, participation rates, relative prices with re-
spect to GDP deflator (VAT-consumption, government consumption, private investment, export, 
and import), government investment price relative to private investment, nominal policy rate, and 
nominal shares of GDP (consumption, government consumption, investment, government in-
vestment, government interest payment, transfers, public debt, wage bill  and exports). The list of 
observables also includes the oil price and the effective exchange rate of the EA. For the ROW 
we use data on population, GDP, GDP deflator and the nominal policy rate. The EA specific QE 
observables are securities held for monetary policy purposes as proxy for long-term bond hold-
ings by the ECB and the share of long-term debt in total government debt. Furthermore, we use 
current and 3-month-ahead swap rates on 10-year government bonds to calculate the implied ex-
pected period-on-period return on long-term bonds. 
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4. Model fit 
 
Figure A.1: Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction 
 
Figure A.1 shows the Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction for various observable variables. The red 
line indicates the observed series from 1999q1-2016q2. The black line depicts the posterior mean 
estimate of the 1-step-ahead forecast of the endogenous variable calculated by the Kalman filter. 
The grey confidence bounds represent the posterior parameter uncertainty.  
